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WHAT PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS?
Jan Willem Wieland1
ABSTRACT
What is the Problem of Universals? In this paper we take up the classic question and
proceed as follows. In Sect. 1 we consider three problem solving settings and define the
notion of problem solving accordingly. Basically I say that to solve problems is to
eliminate undesirable, unspecified, or apparently incoherent scenarios. In Sect. 2 we apply
the general observations from Sect. 1 to the Problem of Universals . More specifically, we
single out two accounts of the problem which are based on the idea of eliminating
apparently incoherent scenarios, and then propose modifications of those two accounts
which, by contrast, are based on the idea of eliminating unspecified scenarios. In Sect. 3 we
spell out two interesting ramifications.
1. Problem solving
‘What problem?’ In any debate, this is one of the first methodological
questions that can always be posed. What is it that we are trying to deal
with? Or again: what are we doing here? So let us take a closer look at
what problems, in all generality, consist of, and define the notion of
problem solving accordingly. Consider the following three problem
solving settings.
Case 1. You are thirsty, and you want to quench your thirst. The
problem, here, consists of two elements: a state (i.e. your thirst), and a
desire to get rid of this state. Alternatively: the problem consists of the
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state, and a desire to obtain the absence of the state. There is a problem
primarily because of the second element: there is nothing to be solved if
you do not care about your thirst (or if you care about your thirst in
another way). In the range of possible solutions we find beer. If you drink
a beer, you are not thirsty any longer and the problem is solved.
Case 2. You are thirsty, and you want to know why. The problem, again,
consists of two elements: a state (i.e. your thirst), and a desire to
eliminate your ignorance about this state. Alternatively: the problem
consists of the state, and a desire to obtain more information about it, e.g.
to uncover its causes or features. Again, there is a problem primarily
because of the second element: there is nothing to be solved if you do not
care about your ignorance (or if you care about your ignorance in another
way). In the range of possible solutions we find the scenario that your
thirst is caused by the fact that you are running around for some time. If
you acquire this piece of knowledge, you are not ignorant any longer (at
least with respect to one important cause of your thirst) and the problem
is solved.
Case 3. You are thirsty, and you do not understand why because you
stopped running around a while ago and just had your beer. The problem,
again, consists of two elements: a state (i.e. your thirst), and a desire to
get rid of your wrong expectations about this state. Alternatively: the
problem consists of the state, and a desire to bring about coherence
between your beliefs and the state at issue, i.e. between the belief (and
the related expectation) that normally when you drink something you
quench your thirst and the state that you, despite the beer, are still thirsty.
Again, there is a problem primarily because of the second element: there
is nothing to be solved if you do not care about your wrong expectations
(or, again, if you care about your wrong expectations in another way). In
the range of possible solutions we find the scenario that your thirst is
caused by the beer you had. If you acquire this extra information, the
situation is not incoherent any longer, and the problem is solved.
Let us single out the connection between the three cases. In one
sense, they are all about the elimination of scenarios. In the first case it is
about the elimination of an undesirable scenario. In the second it is about
the elimination of a vague, unspecified scenario. In the third it is about
the elimination of an apparently incoherent (i.e. impossible) scenario. In
another sense, the three cases are all about the obtaining of scenarios. In
the first it is about the obtaining of a desired scenario. In the second it is
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2 Interesting observations of the referee: (i) problems of the first variety are
different from the others in that there is nothing to be found out (except perhaps
how to remove X), i.e. no questions to be answered; (ii) problems of the third
variety are different from the others in that they are real conundrums.
about the obtaining of a specified scenario where things have been made
explicit. In the third it is about the obtaining of a coherent scenario where
apparent contradictions or counterexamples have been resolved.
Summing up, problem solving can be defined as follows:
(PS-1) Problem solving is the enterprise of eliminating (i)
undesirable, (ii) unspecified, or (iii) seemingly incoherent
scenarios, i.e. of obtaining (i) desired, (ii) specified, or (iii)
coherent scenarios.
What the three cases furthermore have in common is that they consist of
a particular state plus a particular desire. In all three cases the state is the
same: you are thirsty. Call this state X. The cases differ as to what you
want from X. In the first you simply want X’s absence. In the second you
want information about X. In the third you want to bring about coherence
between your beliefs and X. These desires can be associated with certain
problem solving tasks: (i) remove X, (ii) acquire information about X,
(iii) make your beliefs coherent with X. On the basis of this, problem
solving can also be defined as follows:
(PS-2) Problem solving is the enterprise of carrying out one of the
following tasks with respect to a certain state X: (i) remove
X, (ii) acquire information about X, or (iii) make your
beliefs coherent with X.
I am not sure whether one of the three tasks is more important or
primitive than the other two, i.e. that they can be cashed out in terms of
one another,2 and it is not unlikely that there are more kinds of things you
may want from X. If so, the definitions have to be modified accordingly.
Also: how is it possible that problems have both a subjective and an
objective side? On the one hand, they are subjectively motivated (you
want something from a certain state), and there are no problems without
this element. On the other, we can discover problems, and not just create
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them, and they may have solutions with objective validity (the same
solution can work for others with a similar problem). And there are more
interesting topics that cannot be dealt with here. In the next section we
apply the general observations on problem solving so far to the Problem
of Universals in metaphysics.
2. Problems of Universals
As Armstrong introduces the Problem of Universals:
In some minimal or pre-analytic sense there are things having
certain properties and standing in certain relations. But, as Plato
was the first to point out, this situation is a profoundly puzzling
one, at least for philosophers. (1978: 11)
The question is: what, actually, is so puzzling? It is rather strange that
this question has been asked only incidentally, while discussion of the
solutions to the Problem of Universals prevails in metaphysics (the
Realism versus Nominalism debate). What are Realism about Universals,
Class Nominalism, Ostrich Nominalism, etc. doing there? What is it that
they are trying to solve? In this section I first single out two different
answers to this question which are both based on the idea of eliminating
apparently incoherent scenarios (2.1-2.2), and then formulate
modifications of those two accounts which are, by contrast, based on the
idea of eliminating unspecified scenarios (2.3).
2.1. One over Many3
The classic account:
The same property can belong to different things. The same
relation can relate different things. Apparently, there can be
something identical in things which are not identical. Things are
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one at the same time as that they are many. How is this possible?
(Armstrong 1978: 11) 
According to this account, there is an apparent contradiction between the
fact that things are different from each other and the fact that they can
have the same properties, and the problem would consist in the task of
eliminating this seemingly incoherent scenario. The relevant state, in this
case, is: the items x, y, etc. have the same property F.4 The conflicting
belief is: x, y, etc. are distinct items. The belief conflicts with the state, if
so, because of our initial expectation that distinct items cannot have the
same property. The problem solving task is to make the conflicting belief
coherent with the state, and to revise our initial expectation. Put in terms
of a question:
(OOM) How is it possible that x, y, etc. have the same property F,
given the fact that x, y, etc. are distinct items?
For instance, how is it possible that Do Make Say Think, The Notwist
and Jaga Jazzist all have the very same property of being a band, given
the fact that they are three distinct items?
2.2. Many over One
Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002a: 46-7) presents a slightly different account:
there is an apparent contradiction between the fact that things are
identical with themselves and the fact that they have many different
properties, and the problem would consist in the task of eliminating this
seemingly incoherent scenario. The relevant state, here, is: item x has
many properties F, G, etc. The conflicting belief is: x is one item
identical with itself. The belief conflicts with the state, if so, because of
our initial expectation that one single item cannot have many properties.
The problem solving task is to make the conflicting belief coherent with
the state, and to revise our initial expectation. Put in terms of a question:
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(MOO) How is it possible that x has many properties F, G, etc.,
given the fact that x is a single item identical with itself?
To use the very same words of Armstrong: “Things are one at the same
time as that they are many. How is this possible?” For instance, how is it
possible that Do Make Say Think has the property of being a band, and
the property of being multi-membered, and the property of bringing out
music under titles like ‘You, You’re a History in Rust’ and ‘The Whole
Story of Glory’, etc.?
2.3. Modifications
These two accounts, i.e. the OOM and MOO, are in the right direction, I
take it, but inadequate. The point is that it is not the incoherence that is
doing the work. The incoherence is easily resolved by way of conceptual
analysis (cf. MacBride 2002). More specifically, the incoherence
disappears as soon as we focus upon the distinction between numerical
identity and distinctness on the one hand, and qualitative identity and
distinctness on the other. Items can be numerically distinct and yet
qualitatively identical (i.e. have the same property). Likewise: one single
item can be numerically identical and yet qualitatively distinct (i.e. have
different properties). These are two perfectly coherent scenarios.
However, if the solution to the Problem of Universals were this
easy, there would be no need for complete theories like Realism about
Universals or Resemblance Nominalism. There is more going on.
Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002b: §4) suggests that we, in addition, have to
spell out what qualitative identity and distinctness consist in. This is
right. But then it is not the incoherence that drives the problem solving
task. Spelling out what qualitative identity and distinctness consist in has
nothing to do with the elimination of apparent contradictions.
My suggestion is that the problem solving task is motivated by the
situation’s vagueness. That is, the Problem of Universals is a demand for
specification, for a certain kind of information. As is well known, this
information is not about causes, and hence the problem solving task is
not one of eliminating unspecified causes (cf. Oliver 1996: 9). For
instance, the problem is not about what causes the fact that Do Make Say
Think, The Notwist and Jaga Jazzist all have the same property of being
a band, or about what causes the fact that Do Make Say Think has the
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many properties of being a band, of being multi-membered, and of
bringing out music under titles like ‘You, You’re a History in Rust’ and
‘The Whole Story of Glory’. Nevertheless, the problem might be taken as
a demand for information about unspecified identities and differences
among facts.
Take the fact that Do Make Say Think has the property of being a
band. Just like any other fact, this is one fact among many.5 Then pick
out its contrasting facts. In this case we have the contrasting fact that
Jaga Jazzist has the property of being a band, and the contrasting fact that
Do Make Say Think has the property of being multi-membered, among
many others. If we ask about qualitative identity and distinctness, we
want to know two things. First question: what is the identity between the
fact that Do Make Say Think has the property of being a band and the
fact that Jaga Jazzist has the property of being a band? We would expect
an objective, worldly identity among these facts. So in virtue of what are
they identical? What are the identity makers? This is the question about
qualitative identity. The second question is this: what is the difference
between the fact that Do Make Say Think has the property of being a
band and the fact that Do Make Say Think has the property of being
multi-membered? We would expect an objective, worldly difference
among these facts. So in virtue of what are they different? What are the
difference makers? This is the question about qualitative distinctness.
At this very point theories like Realism about Universals and
Resemblance Nominalism enter the stage. According to e.g. Realism
about Universals, the identity between the fact that Do Make Say Think
has the property of being a band and the fact that Jaga Jazzist has the
property of being a band is that both Do Make Say Think and Jaga
Jazzist exemplify the universal being a band; and the difference between
the fact that Do Make Say Think has the property of being a band and the
fact that Do Make Say Think has the property of being multi-membered
is that in the former case Do Make Say Think exemplifies the universal
being a band, in the latter case Do Make Say Think exemplifies the
universal being multi-membered, and these two universals are non-
identical. Or according to Resemblance Nominalism, the identity
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between the fact that Do Make Say Think has the property of being a
band and the fact that Jaga Jazzist has the property of being a band is that
both Do Make Say Think and Jaga Jazzist resembles all bands; and the
difference between the fact that Do Make Say Think has the property of
being a band and the fact that Do Make Say Think has the property of
being multi-membered is that in the former case Do Make Say Think
resembles all other bands, in the latter case Do Make Say Think
resembles all other multi-membered items, and the group of bands and
the group of multi-membered items are non-identical.
It can be pointed out that the question about qualitative identity is
a modification of the OOM, and the question about qualitative
distinctness is a modification of the MOO. As said, the OOM and MOO
are based on the idea of eliminating apparently incoherent scenarios.
Their modifications (which I shall dub OOM* and MOO* from now on)
are rather based on the idea of eliminating unspecified scenarios. Let us
formulate OOM* and MOO* in full generality:6
(OOM*) For any items x, y and all properties F, if x is F and y is F,
what is the identity between these two facts?
Fx identity? Fy
(MOO*) For any item x and all properties F, G, if x is F and x is G,
what is the difference between these two facts?
Fx difference? Fy
It can be shown that any solution to the Problem of Universals holds
these identities and differences to be specifiable (whether this be in terms
of exemplification of universals, or resemblances, as we saw, or in terms
of possession of tropes, class membership, falling under predicates, or
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Universals, but shall not discuss this here.
what have you), except the theory which goes under the name Ostrich
Nominalism (Armstrong 1978: 16; Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002a: §3.1). The
Ostrich* (i.e. the sceptic about OOM* and MOO*) maintains that the
identity between the fact that x is F and the fact that y is F and the
difference between the fact that x is F and the fact that x is G is brute and
unspecifiable. That is, according to this theory there would be no
informative answer to the question about the identity between the fact
that Do Make Say Think has the property of being a band and the fact
that Jaga Jazzist has the property of being a band, nor about the
difference between the fact that Do Make Say Think has the property of
being a band and the fact that Do Make Say Think has the property of
being multi-membered. Any other solution to the Problem of Universals,
however, does have something to say here. Moreover, by the OOM* and
MOO* their whole problem solving task is to have something to say
here.7
3. Ramifications
In this section we spell out two ramifications of the foregoing: one about
explanation in metaphysics (3.1), and one about infinite regresses (3.2).
3.1. Explanation
Consider the explanatory claim:
(E) x is F because Z.
where Z is a placeholder for what the specific solutions to the Problem of
Universals have to say. More specifically, by Realism about Universals Z
= x exemplifies the F-universal; by Trope Theory Z = x has a F-trope; by
Resemblance Nominalism Z = x resembles all Fs; by Class Nominalism Z
= x belongs to the class of all Fs; by Predicate Nominalism Z = x falls
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under a ‘F’-predicate; and by Ostrich Nominalism Z = of nothing. If we
fill out e.g. the first and third option we get:
(1) x is F because x exemplifies the F-universal.
(2) x is F because x belongs to the class of all Fs.
The question is: what do such explanatory claims amount to? What
explains and what is explained? Or again: what, if anything, does
‘because’ mean in the claims (1) and (2)? If we assume that explanation
in philosophy is a species of problem solving (which is the general line I
am exploring here), this question can be answered as follows: ‘x is F’ in
(E) is short for a certain (solved) problem, and Z in (E) is short for a
certain solution. As we have seen, the Problem of Universals can be
taken in at least two ways, which means that (1) and (2) can be read in at
least those two ways. Here are the readings of the OOM* and MOO*
respectively:
(1*) The fact that x is F and fact that y is F are identical (partly, not
wholly of course) because in both cases the objects exemplify the
F-universal.
(2*) The fact that x is F and fact that y is F are (partly) identical
because in both cases the objects belong to the class of all Fs.
(1**) The fact that x is F and the fact that x is G are (partly) different
because in the former case x exemplifies the F-universal, in the
latter the G-universal.
(2**) The fact that x is F and the fact that x is G are (partly) different
because in the former case x belongs to the F-class, in the latter x
belongs to the G-class.
By the OOM* and MOO* ‘because’ indicates that we are eliminating
unspecified identities and differences. Hopefully this partially meets the
scepticism about explanation in the present context voiced by e.g. Oliver
(1996: 6, 75) and Daly (2005: §2). Compare also the OOM and MOO
explanations where ‘because’ indicates the elimination of apparent
contradictions:
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- It is possible that both x and y are F because x and y can be numerically
distinct and yet qualitatively identical.
- It is possible that x is both F and G because x can be numerically
identical and yet qualitatively distinct.
3.2. Regress
As Armstrong (1978) points out, all main solutions to the Problem of
Universals are regressing.8 In this last section we spell out these regresses
in some detail, and show that their course quite depends on the specific
problem at issue, e.g. whether we are dealing with OOM* or MOO*.
Armstrong delivers the following key observation:
If a’s being F is analysed as a’s having R to a ø, then Raø is one of
the situations of the sort that the theory undertakes to analyse. So it
must be a matter of the ordered pair <a, ø> having R' to a new ø-
like entity: øR. If R and R' are different, the same problem arises
with R' and so on ad infinitum. (1978: 70-1)
There are two important points. First: that some x has a certain property
is explained by the fact that x stands in a certain relation R to a second
item ø. For instance, by Realism about Universals R is the
exemplification relation and ø is a universal, and by Resemblance
Nominalism R is the resemblance relation and ø is a group of other items
(of the same sort as x). Second: that x stands in R to ø can be explained in
a similar way. Consider the relational variant of claim (E):
(E*) x stands in R to y because Z.
Again, Z is a placeholder for what the specific solutions to the Problem
of Universals have to say: by Realism about Universals (and assuming
that R is non-symmetric) Z = the ordered pair <x,y> exemplifies the R-
universal; by Trope Theory Z = <x,y> has a F-trope; by Resemblance
Nominalism Z = <x, y> resembles all R-pairs; by Class Nominalism Z =
<x,y> belongs to the class of all R-pairs; by Predicate Nominalism Z =
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<x,y> falls under a ‘R’-predicate; and by Ostrich Nominalism Z = of
nothing. If we fill out e.g. the first and third option we get:
(3) x stands in R to y because <x,y> exemplifies the R-universal.
(4) x stands in R to y because <x,y> belongs to the class of all R-pairs.
The Exemplification Regress can be obtained by linking (1) and (3): x is
F because x exemplifies the F-universal; x stands in the exemplification
relation to the F-universal because <x,F> exemplifies the exemplification
universal (E1); <x,F> stands in the exemplification relation to the E1-
universal because <<x,F>,E1> exemplifies the second-order
exemplification universal (E2); and so on infinitely. Similarly, the Class
Membership Regress can be obtained by linking (2) and (4): x is F
because x belongs to the class of all Fs (CF); x belongs to CF because
<x,CF> belongs to the class of all pairs where the one is member of the
other (CM1); <x,CF> belongs to CM1 because <<x,CF>,CM1> belongs to the
class of all second-order pairs where the one is member of the other
(CM2); and so on infinitely. The regresses of the other solutions to the
Problem of Universals can be generated in a similar way.
But this is only half of the story. It is true that the course of the
regress depends on the solution to the Problem of Universals. But it is
equally true (and this has to my mind gone unnoticed in the literature)
that the course of the regress depends on the construal of the problem
itself. Generally, regresses are not just chains of solutions (or
explanatory claims); they are chains of problem-solution pairs. As a
consequence, two rather different Exemplification Regresses can be
generated within Realism about Universals just by varying the problem:
Exemplification Regress OOM*-wise
(P1) What is the identity between the fact that x has the property F and
the fact that y has the property F?
(S1) The fact that x is F and the fact that y is F are (partly) identical
because both x and y exemplify the F-universal.
(P2) What is the identity between the fact that <x,F> stands in the
exemplification relation and e.g. the fact that <y,F> stands in this
relation?
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(S2) The fact that <x,F> stands in the exemplification relation and the
fact that <y,F> stands in this relation are (partly) identical because both
<x,F> and <y,F> exemplify the exemplification universal E1.
(P3) What is the identity between the fact that <<x,F>,E1> stands in the




(P1) What is the difference between the fact that x has the property F and
the fact that x has the property G?
(S1) The fact that x is F is (partly) different from the fact that x is G
because in the former case x exemplifies the F-universal, in the latter x
exemplifies the G-universal.
(P2) What is the difference between the fact that <x,F> stands in the
exemplification relation E1 and the fact that <x,F> stands in some other
relation R?
(S2) The fact that <x,F> stands in the exemplification relation is (partly)
different from the fact that <x,F> stands in R because in the former case
<x,F> exemplifies the E1-universal, in the latter <x,F> exemplifies the R-
universal.
(P3) What is the difference between the fact that <<x,F>,E1> stands in
the exemplification relation E2 and the fact that <<x,F>,E1> stands in
some other relation R?
etc.
The same can be done for e.g. Class Nominalism:
Class Membership Regress OOM*-wise
(P1) What is the identity between the fact that x has the property F and
the fact that y has the property F?
(S1) The fact that x is F and the fact that y is F are (partly) identical
because both x and y are member of the class CF of all Fs.
(P2) What is the identity between the fact that <x,CF> stands in the class
membership relation and e.g. the fact that <y,CF> stands in this relation?
(S2) The fact that <x,CF> stands in the class membership relation and the
fact that <y, CF> stands in this relation are (partly) identical because both
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<x,CF> and <y,CF> are member of the class CM1 of all ordered pairs
where the one is member of the other.
(P3) What is the identity between the fact that <<x,CF>,CM1> stands in
the class membership relation and e.g. the fact that <<y,CF>,CM1> stands
in this relation?
etc.
Class Membership Regress MOO*-wise
(P1) What is the difference between the fact that x has the property F and
the fact that x has the property G?
(S1) The fact that x is F is (partly) different from the fact that x is G
because in the former case x is member of the F-class, in the latter x is
member of the G-class.
(P2) What is the difference between the fact that <x,CF> stands in the
class membership relation and the fact that <x,CF> stands in some other
relation R?
(S2) The fact that <x,CF> stands in the class membership relation is
(partly) different from the fact that <x,CF> stands in R because in the
former case <x,CF> is member of the class CM1 of all ordered pairs where
the one is member of the other, in the latter <x,CF> is member of the
class of all R-pairs.
(P3) What is the difference between the fact that <<x,CF>,CM1> stands in
the class membership relation and the fact that <<x,CF>,CM1> stands in
some other relation R?
etc.
The question is whether these regresses are harmful for Realism about
Universals and Class Nominalism respectively, and, if so, whether they
can be blocked. Likewise, the question is whether the regresses generated
by the other solutions to the Problem of Universals (Resemblance
Regresses, etc.) can be used as an objection to them. I am sceptic. But
this interesting topic has to wait for another day.
4. Recap
In this paper we asked: what is the Problem of Universals? We showed
that there was an easy problem, and a more difficult one. To solve the
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Problem of Universals is not only to distinguish between the notions of
numerical identity and distinctness, and qualitative identity and
distinctness (the easy problem), but also to provide information about
what qualitative identity and distinctness consist in (the more difficult
problem). We have seen that it is important to get clear on the problem,
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